CEO CANDOR AND THE BALANCE SHEET

FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING SMARTS

A well-known speechwriter asked me recently:  Why should CEOs include financial results in their shareholder letters?  After all, he said, these numbers have been released and digested months before the letter appears.  I told him it was very important.  It allows me to see if a CEO can intelligently explain the significance of the company’s financial results.

In Avon’s 2008 shareholder letter, for instance, CEO Andrea Jung boasted that the company sells products to their Representatives on credit.  This makes the company the largest microlender to women.  “For the most part,” she wrote, “our Representatives don’t pay us until they get paid by their customers.”  But this statement raised a host of questions:  For instance, where does Avon record these loans on its balance sheet? How long does it take the company to collect payments from its Reps for products sold to customers?  How does Avon track this credit exposure and how much of these Accounts Receivables do they collect?

The chart below shows that from 2000 to 2010, Doubtful Accounts as a percentage of Accounts Receivables climbed from 8 to 28 percent, a troubling sign in a tough economy. (Click on table for larger view.)

In Avon’s 2010 shareholder letter, Jung reported: “In terms of the balance sheet, we recently announced our 20th consecutive year of dividend increases for our shareholders.”  But why was she was connecting dividends and the balance sheet?   Dividends are reported on the income statement, not the balance sheet.

A connection may have been made in the November 10th earnings call when a financial analyst asked if the company was borrowing to pay the dividend.  Charles Cramb, Avon’s Vice-Chairman of the Developed Market Group answered: “We have a free cash flow that does not fully cover the dividend, given some of the things we’ve had from our disappointing cash management…”

Read his answer again.  It doesn’t require much reading between the lines to learn that cash flow had become a problem and is not fully covering the dividend.  Cramb continued to describe problems they were having with “one-time cash outlays that are in excess of expenses on restructuring.”  This is high-quality obfuscation.  Like smoke in a forest, it makes me want to search for the fire.

CEO CANDOR AND METRICS

WE TREASURE WHAT WE MEASURE

My sister buys Avon products.  She values her personal relationships with her Avon Representatives, perhaps even more than the products.  Most Avon reps are friends and family; they are people she likes and trusts.

CEO Andrea Jung knows that sales Reps are important.  In her 2007 shareholder letter, she wrote:  “The number of Active Representatives has always been a defining measure of our company’s success.”  In fact, Avon has reported on the total number of year-end sales Representatives in each shareholder letter for the past eleven years.

In the 2000 letter, CEO Jung reported that Avon had 3.4 million independent Representatives.  In 2001, she wrote “the number of active Representatives in the direct selling channel grew 10 percent to 3.5 million.”  I paused and did the math:  to grow from 3.5 million Reps to 3.4 million is a 2.9 percent rate, not 10 percent.  I wondered why Jung used two different terms to describe Avon’s Reps over these two years.  Perhaps this is why the growth rates didn’t add up.

In her 2006 letter, Jung reported that Avon had “350,000 licensed Sales Promoters” in China.  Of this number, “150,000 fit our standard definition for active Representatives.”  She confirmed what I had suspected:  the company does have a “standard definition”.  But Jung never explained what this is.

The chart below summarizes year-end Rep growth rates reported in shareholder letters.  As you can see, the quality of this reporting began to decline in 2004.  A major company restructuring in 2005 and 2006 may explain why no sales rep growth numbers were reported during those years. (Click on table for larger view.)

From 2007 to 2010, the Representative growth rates didn’t match. Compare the published rates and the mathematically derived rates in the data above.  For instance, how can Avon’s published Rep growth rate of 9 percent in 2009 be accurate if the number of reps in 2008 and 2009 was the same?  That is a zero growth rate.

Why don’t the numbers add up?  Is this due to (1) shifting definitions of Representatives, or (2) a corporate culture in which meeting the numbers – as most companies try to do — has become as important as meeting the customers? Consider that the terms “active Reps”, “Active Reps”, “Representatives”, “Avon Reps” and “Leadership Reps” appear 116 times in 10 years of letters.  How many times can you find the words “personal relationships”?  Three.

CEO CANDOR AND EXECUTION

AVON IN A HEAP OF TROUBLE

As I write, Avon is in a heap of trouble.  The company is facing SEC investigations.  In May, it fired executives who allegedly bribed Chinese officials in violation of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  When CEO Andrea Jung hosted Avon’s third quarter earnings teleconference call on November 10, 2011, she faced tough questions from the company’s financial analysts.  Here are three:

 1.  I’m curious why you didn’t comment on the now-multiple SEC investigations.  Is there anything you can say at all…why should investors believe management and the board has any control over the business at this point?
2.  …obviously execution’s been a bigger deal [in Brazil], and it seems like it’s kind of run past you guys. …it sounds like the market’s changed. You guys haven’t kept up with it.
3.  Why does bribery, no cash being generated in the U.S. and the Brazil debacle happen… what’s going on internally that leads to these [boom/bust] cycles?

Throughout the call I thought:  These analysts appear to be surprised by Avon’s problems.  They must not have been reading the shareholder letters carefully and judging the company’s candor performance.  If they had, they might have seen the trend in the chart below.  The dotted red line shows that Avon’s CEO Candor Ranking was stuck in the bottom candor quartile for most of the decade.  Out of the 100 companies in my annual survey, Avon’s ten-year average CEO Candor ranking is a dismal 85.


The solid red line in the chart plots Avon’s stock performance.  During this same period when candor scores revealed chinks in the company’s strategy, the stock traded above the S&P 500. Only recently did it dip below the market.  Throughout, I have wondered why investors were blind to this persistent obfuscation? Did they simply not see it or did they choose not to see it?

THE DYNAMIC AND DUBIOUS DOZEN

The “Individual Investor” columnist Jason Zweig (who has since moved from Time Inc. to The Wall Street Journal) interviewed me for a story in 2004.  He asked, why do you read CEO shareholder letters, the ones in corporate annual reports?  Aren’t numbers more important than words?

Absolutely, I said, numbers are important, but you want to know if they can be trusted.  That’s why I read executive communications.  You want to size up the values in the corporate culture.  Why is this vital information?  Because accounting numbers are based on human judgments.  Employees throughout a company decide when to count incoming and outgoing cash, where to book expenses, and how much to report. Over time, these decisions become the numbers we see in income statements and balance sheets.  Smart investors want assurance that these judgments are trustworthy.

Jason Zweig

How can you tell?  Examine the words of the CEO and ask yourself:  Are the executive’s communications candid or confused?  What does the CEO stand for?  What kind of corporate culture is he or she building?  What are the company’s values and do they inspire responsible or irresponsible behavior?  It’s not always easy to see.  Over the years I have developed a taxonomy and scoring system to help me analyze and quantify the presence or absence of candor in these communications.

I told Zweig that my CEO candor analyses show that leaders ranking high in candor will win investor trust and dollars.  He interrupted, “Could you repeat that?  “Why?” I asked.  “Because I’ve been trying to find someone who has been measuring that.”

I told him that my research shows a consistent link between measures of CEO candor and stock performance.  Each year the stocks of top-ranked companies in my annual CEO Candor survey have outperformed, on average, the stocks of those at the bottom.  This connection between candor and performance seems obvious.  Candid CEOs are going to encourage prudent judgments and actions, while discouraging reckless ones.  (BARRON’S REPORT)

It pays to know the difference.  When Enron’s shareholder letter was published in early 2001, the stock was trading at about $60 a share.  But that year’s letter revealed serious lapses in candor.  Just eight months later, the stock plunged to $0.60.  AIG is another example.  From 2005 to 2007, the company’s candor scores fell steadily, but the price of the AIG’s stock hardly budged.  In September 2007, the stock traded over $70 a share.  A year later, taxpayers ponied up $85 billion to save the firm.  The stock traded at $1.25 a share.

Over the next three months, CEOs and their investor relations and communication teams will be busy working on 2011 shareholder letters.  During this time, I will feature the Dynamic and Dubious Dozen, twelve companies that have investors on the fence.  I will show how each company’s CEO Candor Ranking is linked to its stock performance.  I will explain how to read between the lines in their shareholder letters.

When the 2011 letters are published, you’ll be ready to size up CEO Trust and Candor.

2010 CEO Candor Survey Results Released

Each year Rittenhouse Rankings publishes its annual benchmark rankings of CEO shareholder letters from annual reports. These rankings are correlated with stock price performance to show the dollar value of CEO communication. 

This year’s key finding: Top-ranked companies outperform bottom-tanked companies for 5th consecutive year.  To read this year’s news release click here. For a list of Top and Bottom-ranked 2010 Survey Companies click here.

CNBC Video Interview of L.J. Rittenhouse

“Is Buffett’s Image Tarnished?” CNBCs Squawk on the Street poses this question to L.J. Rittenhouse at the 2011 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting.  Watch here.

American Capitalism Run Amok: 3 Questions That Won’t Be Asked at Berkshire Hathaway’s Meeting

This weekend, I am attending  my 14th Berkshire Hathaway shareholder meeting. Over the years, I’ve watched Berkshire grow from an upstart insurance/investment company to an elephant-sized conglomerate. By now I know the questions that will surface in Buffett’s six-hour Q&A-athon. I also can guess the questions that won’t be asked. Why? They expose the underbelly of American capitalism. Armed with my analysis of Berkshire’s economic principles (Buffett’s Bites, McGraw-Hill 2010), here are three leading candidates: Read More at the CommPro Blog

When Principles Trump Personalities

David Sokol’s departure refocuses attention on Berkshire’s succession horse race.  It also underscores a vital fact: at Berkshire, principles trump personalities.

Buffett’s moral standard has always been clear:  Never do anything that you would not want your family and friends to see on the front page of the local paper. This principle is reinforced at every Berkshire shareholder meeting with the screening of a 1991 film clip.  In it, Buffett testifies before Congress as the Interim Chairman of Salomon Brothers.  He wants to win back confidence lost after Salomon’s Treasury auction scandal.  Buffett repeats the caution he gave to Salomon employees: Lose money for the firm, and I will be understanding; lose a shred of reputation for the firm, and I will be ruthless.

David Sokol appears to have crossed this line and exercised poor judgment regarding Lubrizol.  He has stated [and Buffett has affirmed] that he wanted to leave Berkshire in the past, but was persuaded to stay.  Now Buffett has accepted Sokol’s resignation.  Did Buffett act ruthlessly?  No, he acted predictably on principle.  Should he have grilled Sokol who told him in “a passing comment” that he owned shares in Lubrizol?  Most likely, but Buffett operates on trust.  He trusted Mr. Sokol who has contributed immensely to Berkshire’s success.

Sokol’s departure raises an important question about Berkshire’s future. Widely regarded as a leading candidate to become CEO, Sokol had been acting as Berkshire’s Chief Operating Officer, an increasingly important role. Writing in his 2007 shareholder letter, Buffett reminded investors that earnings from non-insurance operating companies, were and would continue to exceed earnings from investments.  He wanted to buy companies outright.  But operating businesses require special management skills – the kind that Sokol displayed in his rapid turnaround of troubled Net Jets and leadership at Johns-Manville.  Buffett’s gracious comments in his press release credit Sokol’s contributions.

The succession question raised by Sokol’s departure is important:  who among the leading CEO candidates has the experience and skills to be the insider turnaround guy for businesses in trouble?  Anyone in this job is not likely to win popularity contests.  Perhaps Berkshire needs a triumvirate management model:  a CEO (Chief Capital Allocator and Chief Risk Officer, the principal roles played by Buffett), a Chief Investment Officer and a Chief Operating Officer.

This decision will be made by Berkshire’s board, which not only upholds fiduciary responsibilities to owner-partners, but also stewards Berkshire’s unique trust and principles based culture.  The current media frenzy shows how tough a job this is in a Twitter-fed environment where straight talk generates bigger headlines than blatant obfuscation.

Harvard Business Review Reports on Rittenhouse Rankings

Go to HBR.org to find L.J.’s blog on Warren Buffett’s 2010 Shareholder Letter: What to Expect.  It was posted today on their Conversation Blog: “a home for inspired insights and observations.”  To view the article, click here.  Tell us please if you were inspired.

On the Money! NPR Interview with LJ Rittenhouse

Today, Warren Buffett tapped hedge fund manager Todd Combs to be Berkshire Hathaway’s Chief Investment Officer. How will Todd Combs fit into Berkshire? Tune into NPR‘s On the Money interview last week with L.J. (Laura) Rittenhouse, author of Buffett’s Bites to learn what’s important about the Berkshire culture. Host Steve Pomeranz calls Buffett’s Bites his “favorite new book” and asks L.J. how she got Buffett’s attention: the Omaha oracle posed for the book jacket and signed his photograph inside. Learn the answer to this and other questions like: What is Buffett’s greatest investment tip? Click here.

The Five Top NPR On the Money Interview Questions

1. What is the Warren Buffett investment tip that most investors ignore?

2. How difficult is it to find companies that are trustworthy and transparent?

3. Where can you get a sneak preview of some of the most informative, engaging and candid shareholder letters from 2009?

4. What do most folks miss when they read Warren Buffett’s shareholder letter?

5. What well-known rule makes Berkshire Hathaway one of the most respected companies in the world?